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Abstract
Most empirical studies on the impact of labour income taxation on the labour
supply behaviour of households use a unitary modelling approach. In this paper we
empirically analyze income taxation and the choice of working hours by combin-
ing the collective approach for household behaviour and the discrete hours choice
framework with fixed costs of work. We identify the sharing rule parameters with
data on working hours of both the husband and the wife within a couple. Parame-
ter estimates are used to evaluate various model outcomes, like the wage elasticities
of labour supply and the impacts of wage changes on the income sharing between
husband and wife. We also simulate the consequences of a policy change in the
tax system. We find that the collective model has different empirical outcomes
of income sharing than a restricted model that imposes pooling of men’s earnings
and the household’s non-labour income in the female’s budget constraint. These
differences in outcomes have consequences for the evaluation of a policy change in
the tax system.
1We are greatly indebted to Statistics Netherlands for providing the data.
2email: hbloemen@feweb.vu.nl, phone: +31 20 5986037, fax: +31 20 5986005
11 Introduction
The empirical literature on labour supply has devoted much attention to the evaluation of
the impact of the income tax system on the choice of working hours and the participation
decision.3 The focus of the analysis has been increasingly directed towards the joint
labour supply decision of couples.4 Studies known in the literature almost invariably use
the unitary model of household labour supply for this analysis. The unitary approach
assumes the existence of a household utility function, and does not specify the preferences
of the individual household members. Therefore, the intrahousehold allocation process
is ignored. As an empirical implication for the analysis of income taxes, the unitary
model provides no conclusions about the process of income sharing between household
members as income pooling is imposed. Labour supply studies that have tested for the
restrictions of the unitary model on the labour supply of household members, like for
instance the pooling restriction, almost invariably reject the unitary restrictions.5
McElroy and Horney (1981) formulated a household decision model that allows for
individual preferences of household members, and speciﬁes a Nash bargaining process
between husband and wife. The approach by Apps and Rees (1988) only needs the
assumption of eﬃciency, whereas the speciﬁcation of an explicit bargaining rule is not
required. Chiappori (1988, 1992) speciﬁes a collective model of household labour supply.
The collective model explicitly speciﬁes the preferences of the individual household mem-
bers, and assumes Pareto eﬃcient bargaining between household members. Chiappori
(1988, 1992) showed that under certain conditions, like egoistic (or caring) preferences
and the absence of a public good in the household, a sharing rule can be identiﬁed up
to an additive constant. The sharing rule speciﬁes the allocation of income between
household members. The underlying individual preference parameters can be identiﬁed.
The empirical application of the collective model is less straightforward than the
unitary model, which explains why studies on household labour supply and taxes have
3 See e.g. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for an overview.
4 See e.g. Hausman and Ruud (1984), and Van Soest (1995), Hoynes (1996), Keane and Moffit
(1998), and Blundell et al. (1999).
5 In these studies the tax system is not incorporated explicitly. See e.g. Fortin and Lacroix (1997)
for an extensive test of the unitary model.
2concentrated on the unitary model, as indicated by Beninger and Laisney (2002). In the
collective model it is less straightforward to incorporate the participation decision and
taxation. Recently, Blundell et al. (2007) and Donni (2003) extended the identiﬁcation
result of the sharing rule to include the case of nonparticipation by one of the partners.
Bloemen (2009) speciﬁes an empirical model of collective household labour supply which
allows for nonparticipation.
Donni (2003) derives conditions for the implementation of a nonlinear but convex
budget constraint in a collective model. In particular, he shows how the parameters
of the sharing rule can be recovered from the labour supply functions that are based
on virtual wage rates and virtual nonlabour income. His approach is based on the
availability of an explicit expression of the labour supply function (conditional on the
tax bracket) and therefore may be interpreted as a collective version of the Hausman
and Ruud (1984) approach. Bargain and Moreau (2003) simulate a collective model with
taxes and show the implications of using the collective approach various model outcomes.
Beninger and Laisney (2002) simulate data from a speciﬁcation of the collective model
and show how changes in the tax system aﬀect model outcomes. They also estimate a
discrete hours choice model, similar to Van Soest (1995), with simulated collective data,
to see whether the unitary model generates results that are comparable to the collective
model from which the data were generated. The unitary model generates substantially
diﬀerent results than the collective model.6 Vermeulen (2006) used the discrete hours
choice model to empirically implement taxes in a collective type of model. His focus
is on couples with husbands in full-time employment. Vermeulen et al. (2006) suggest
a calibration approach for modelling collective labour supply with income taxes. Their
identiﬁcation strategy, though, is based on comparing married and single women.
In this study we specify an implementable empirical model of household labour supply
with taxes that can be estimated with labour supply data for both husband and wife,
is based on individual preferences, and does not a priori impose income pooling, such
6 It should be noted that there may be several causes for the differences between the outcomes, like
the use of different utility functions, the use of a discrete choice framework, as well as the specification
with the logistic errors. For instance, Beninger and Laisney (2002) find that the model underestimates
the probability of nonparticipation, which was also found in the original discrete hours model, even
when it is extended with fixed cost of work.
3that it can be used for evaluating the household’s income sharing process. We aim
to identify sharing rule parameters and preferences by using data of husband and wife
within couples, rather than by relying on equality of preferences of single and married
females,7 since the restrictions of the collective model set in the original model (Chiappori
1988, 1992) actually are restrictions between the husband’s and wife’s labour supply. For
reasons of ﬂexibility and implementability, we use a discrete hours choice approach. Van
Soest (1995) used the discrete model in context of a unitary household labour supply
model. The ﬂexible utility speciﬁcation in this approach makes the model less suitable
for welfare comparisons, but the model provides a ﬁt between observable working hours
categories and probabilities of ﬁnding a worker in any of these categories, which makes
the model suitable for analyzing the labour supply outcomes of wage changes. Moreover,
the sharing rule describes the assignment of income to the partners within a household,
so the model can be used for analyzing the income sharing process.
For reasons of comparison, we estimate diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. As a refer-
ence case, we specify a restricted sharing rule that pools the earnings of the husband
and the household’s non-labour income (as was also done in many empirical studies on
female labour supply). The implicit assumption in this speciﬁcation is that male and
female wage rates only enter the decision problem as part of the budget set, and there
is no additional inﬂuence, as, for instance, bargaining eﬀects. The alternative is a more
‘ﬂexible’ sharing rule that allows for additional eﬀects of the wage rates and non-labour
income on the sharing of income between partners. We also estimate model speciﬁca-
tions with and without ﬁxed costs of work. Although the more restricted speciﬁcations
are nested in the more ﬂexible speciﬁcations, we do not think that a statistical test as
the likelihood ratio test is the appropriate way to select a preferred model speciﬁcation.
A more ﬂexible speciﬁcation brings the discrete hours distribution implied by the model
easily closer to the empirical distribution function of working hours, and there is a risk of
overparametrizing the model. What matters is whether the more ﬂexible speciﬁcations
really imply diﬀerent behavioural outcomes. We will evaluate the model on basis of
7 The fact that some persons are single and others part of a couple may be related to differences in
preferences for the formation of couples (see Manser and Brown, 1980).
4elasticities of labour supply, the implications for income sharing, and the simulation of
a policy change in the tax system. We use a dataset on childless couples from the Dutch
Socio Economic Panel (SEP) for the years 1990-2001.
The results show that the model variants with a more ‘ﬂexible’ sharing rule have
quite diﬀerent outcomes for the allocation of income between household members, even
if diﬀerences in wage elasticities of labour supply are not that outspoken.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we formulate the collective
version of the discrete hours choice model. In section 3 we present the econometric
speciﬁcation of our model. We specify the utility function of husband and wife, the error
structure, the sharing rule, and the wage distribution. In section 4 we brieﬂy describe the
Dutch income tax system. Section 5 provides descriptive statistics of the data. Section 6
contains the results of estimation and simulation results with tax reforms are presented.
Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The collective framework
In this section we formulate the collective discrete choice model for working hours. By
formulating a discrete choice model we follow the literature on labour supply and taxes
in which the speciﬁcation of discrete choice models for working hours is common prac-
tice nowadays. The ease of implementation of the discrete choice model to incorporate
complex tax systems is the main reason for the fact that this model has been applied so
widely.
Throughout we will consider a two-member household consisting of husband and
wife. The consumption level and the working hours are denoted by (Cm, hm) for the
husband and (Cf , hf) for the wife. Utility of each household member is deﬁned over
consumption and working hours, and is denoted by Uj(Cj , hj), j = m, f . We assume
that preferences are egoistic, and that there are no public goods in the household.8 We
8 Recently, Chiappori et al. (2005) relaxed the assumption of the absence of public goods. However,
identification of the model parameters requires information of the households’ expenditures on the public
good.
5assume that individuals allocate their total time across leisure and paid work. Thus,
we do not consider time that is spent on household production.9 The gross hourly
wage rates of husband and wife, and the household’s nonlabour income are denoted by
wm, wf , and y respectively. Individuals may choose their working hours out of the set
S ≡ {h0, h1, ..., hH},10 (with h0 = 0,H ≥ 1, hj > hj−1, j = 1, ..., H). We assume that
the tax system is known and that the after tax income is a function of the working
hours and the gross hourly wage rates of husband and wife, and of the household’s
non-labour income. Therefore, we denote the after tax income of the household as
g(hm, hf , wm, wf , y).
We assume that for each combination of (hm, hf , wm, wf , y) there exist virtual wage
rates ωj = ωj(hm, hf , wm, wf , y), j = m, f , and a virtual nonlabour income µ =
µ(hm, hf , wm, wf , y) such that g(hm, hf , wm, wf , y) = ωmhm + ωfhf + µ.
Let u¯m(wm, wf , y) denote the utility level that is at least available to the husband.
This utility level can be interpreted as the outcome of some bargaining process that
leads to Pareto eﬃcient allocations. Note that we assume here that the outcome of the
bargaining process depends on gross wage rates and nonlabour income. More general
speciﬁcations are possible. Now we may write the choice problem of the household
members according to the collective model as follows:11
maxhm∈S,hf∈S,Cm,Cf Uf (Cf , hf )
Um(Cm, hm) ≥ u¯m(wm, wf , y)
Cm + Cf = g(hm, hf , wm, wf , y)
S = {h0, ..., hH}
(1)
First, note how the choice of working hours by one partner aﬀects the choice of the other.
If the husband decides to choose a higher level of working hours, the total household
9 Chiappori (1997) incorporates household production in the collective labour supply model. Unfor-
tunately, time spent on household production by separate household members is not observed in our
data.
10 In section 4, in which we describe the data, we will be more specific about the hours values in the
choice set.
11 The total time endowment was normalized to 1. There are alternative representations of the same
maximization problem. By writing down the Lagrangian we may obtain the ‘household welfare function’
which is additive in the utility levels of both husband and wife.
6budget changes and consequently the choice of working hours by the wife may be aﬀected.
Suppose that the husband’s net labour income increases as the result of the increase in
his working hours. Then the impact on the working hours of the wife depends on the
allocation of this additional income to male and female consumption. If part of the
additional income is transferred to the wife and if the wife’s leisure is a normal good,
she may reduce her working hours. If, however, the additional income is spent entirely
on the consumption of the husband, or if the consumption of the wife will be reduced,
the wife’s working hours may stay the same or increase. Consequently, the interaction
of the working hours of husband and wife depends on the way husband and wife share
the total household income, which depends both on their relative bargaining power and
on their preferences. In the unitary model, the additional income raised by the increase
in working hours would be pooled and added to the household income.
2.2 Discrete choice, Pareto efficiency and double indifference
The discrete choice framework may impose additional restrictions on the household’s
income sharing rule. Blundell et al. (2007) formulate a collective model of household
labour supply in which the wife can choose from a continuous range of working hours,
but the husband’s choice is restricted to choosing to work 40 hours a week or not to work
at all, and show that Pareto eﬃciency of the underlying decision problem requires the
‘double indiﬀerence’ condition. This condition states that if the husband is indiﬀerent
between working (40 hours a week) or not working, the wife is also indiﬀerent: the wife’s
utility level is not aﬀected if the husband’s working hours would jump from 40 hours
a week to nonparticipation or back if the husband himself is indiﬀerent between these
two hours levels. If the wife’s utility level were aﬀected, then there would be scope for a
Pareto improvement, which is in contradiction with the Pareto eﬃciency of the household
allocation problem. If the husband’s working hours change from one level to another,
his labour income changes as well. If the husband is indiﬀerent between the two levels
of working hours, the change in consumption generated by the change in income exactly
oﬀsets the change in utility that is due to the change in working hours. If part of the
income change were transferred to the wife, her utility would rise and we would have a
7Pareto improvement which implies that we are not in a Pareto eﬃcient situation. The
implication is that at the reservation wage, the additional income raised by the husband
by an increase in working hours should be assigned entirely to the husband. Note that
this relationship only holds for reservation wage rates, at which the husband is indiﬀerent
between the diﬀerent levels of working hours. At other wages levels, this condition need
(and will) not hold, but the condition places restrictions on the relation between the
preferences and the income sharing rule. If the choice set of working hours is discrete
for a variety of hours levels and diﬀerent hours levels imply diﬀerent income levels, the
double indiﬀerence condition should be satisﬁed for any pair of choices of working hours
of husband and wife. However, if we consider the discrete choice set as an approximation
for the continuous hours choice, discrete ‘jumps’ in income due to ‘jumps’ in working
hours get smaller and smaller the more reﬁned is the discretization of the hours choice
set. But if there are discontinuities in the budget constraint, due to the properties of
the tax and social security system, then the imposition of double indiﬀerence becomes
more fundamental.
2.3 The sharing rule representation
In this section we formulate the sharing rule representation of the decision problem
(1). The discrete choice nature of the decision problem also has implications for the
sharing rule. If the husband’s working hours are equal to hm ∈ S, then the husband’s
consumption level is implicitly deﬁned by
um(Cm, hm) = u¯m(wm, wf , y) (2)
If Vm(., hm) is the inverse of the mapping um(., hm),
12 we may write
Cm = Vm(u¯m(wm, wf , y), hm) = ψ(wm, wf , hm, y) (3)
Equation (3) shows that the consumption of the husband depends on the gross hourly
wage rates wm and wf of husband and wife, on the household’s nonlabour income y, and,
due to the discrete choice nature of our decision problem, it also depends explicitly on
the working hours hm.
12 Conform Blundell et al. (2007).
8To express consumption in terms of virtual wage rates and virtual nonlabour income,
we assume that there exists a function ρ(ωm, ωf , hm, µ) such that
ωmhm + ρ(ωm, ωf , hm, µ) = ψ(wm, wf , hm, y) (4)
in which ωm, ωf and µ are the virtual wage rates and nonlabour income deﬁned ear-
lier. The virtual wage rates and the nonlabour income are, in general, functions of
(wm, wf , hm, hf , y), the gross wage rates, working hours, and the household’s nonlabour
income. Note that in this notation the wife’s share is µ − ρ = µ(wm, wf , hm, hf , y) −
ρ(ωm, ωf , hm, y). Note that the sharing rule ρ(.) describes for each combination of work-
ing hours, wage rates and nonlabour income how the household income is allocated
between husband and wife. The collective discrete hours decision problem can be repre-
sented by two individual decision problems, conditional on the sharing rule. Partner j
in the household chooses his or her working hours by solving the following problem:
maxhj∈S uj(Cj , hj)
subject to Cj = ωjhj + ρj(ωm, ωf , hm, µ)
ωj = ωj(wm, wf , hm, hf , y), µ = µ(wm, wf , hm, hf , y)
ρm = ρ, ρf = µ− ρ
j = m, f
(5)
Note that the decision problem described in (5) somehow resembles a repeated game.
Both partners know the sharing rule and incorporate what the other partner will do in
response to their choice of working hours.13
2.4 Choice probabilities and identification of the sharing rule
In the continuous hours context Chiappori (1988) derives the identiﬁcation of the shar-
ing rule (up to an additive constant). He shows that the impacts of wage rates and
nonlabour income on the sharing rule are nonparametrically identiﬁed. With a sample
13 Chiappori et al. (2002) emphasized, among others, in their empirical application the importance
of having ‘stable’ households in the sample, in which the partners know each other for quite some years,
which makes it more likely that the hypothesis of efficiency in the intrahousehold decision process is
satisfied.
9of observations on working hours, wage rates, and nonlabour income of working cou-
ples, we can identify the impacts of wage rates and nonlabour income on each partner’s
working hours. The identiﬁcation of the sharing rule stems from restrictions that the
collective framework imposes on the way these variables aﬀect working hours: the hus-
band’s (wife’s) wage rate aﬀects the working hours of the wife (husband) only through
the sharing rule, whereas the shares of husband and wife add-up to nonlabour income.
Exploiting these restrictions, the impact of wage rates and nonlabour income on work-
ing hours can be decomposed into their impact on the sharing rule and their impact on
working hours through the individual labour supply equation. Now that we are working
with a discrete choice framework, the original identiﬁcation result cannot be directly
applied anymore. However, it is not hard to point at the similarities between the iden-
tiﬁcation in the continuous hours model and the discrete choice model. In a discrete
choice framework, instead of measuring the impact of wage rates and nonlabour income
on (expected) working hours, we measure the impact of these variables on the choice
probabilities of diﬀerent categories of working hours. The collective model then predicts
that the other partner’s wage rate enters the choice probability of a speciﬁc number of
working hours by the sharing rule, and places restrictions on the way in which nonlabour
income enters the choice probabilities. Consequently, a formal proof of (nonparametric)
identiﬁcation may show that information on the empirical frequency distribution of dif-
ferent hours categories, wage rates, and nonlabour income, together with the collective
restrictions of the impact of the latter variables on the choice probabilities, can be used
to identify the eﬀects of the wage rates and nonlabour income on the sharing rule. Addi-
tional complications arise due to the tax system and non-linear budget constraint. Donni
(2003) conditions for identiﬁcation for that case. It is beyond the scope of this applied
paper to prove nonparametric identiﬁcation. Instead, we will choose functional forms for
the utility function and the distribution of stochastics, and we will show that from the
reduced form parameters that measure the eﬀects of wage rates and nonlabour income
on the choice probabilities, we can recover the parameters that measure the eﬀects of
these variables on the sharing rule.
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3 Econometric specification
3.1 The error structure
Cf. Van Soest (1995) we add an error term, distributed according to the extreme value
distribution, to the utility levels of each working hours level from the choice set. Sup-
pose that the observed numbers of working hours of husband and wife are hkm and h
l
f
respectively, with k, l ∈ {0, ..., H}. We denote the utility of husband and wife by
um(C
kl
m , h
k
m) = u
kl
m(νm) + ǫ
k
m
uf (C
lk
f , h
l
f) = u
lk
f (νf ) + ǫ
l
f
k, l ∈ {0, ..., H}
(6)
The superscripts kl and lk denote that the values of the utility levels depend on hkm and
hlf , whereas νm and νf represent unobserved heterogeneity aﬀecting preferences but not
speciﬁc to the hours category chosen. For the additive error terms ǫkm and ǫ
l
f we make the
following assumptions: (i) ǫrj , j = m, f, r = 0, ..., H, are independently and identically
distributed according to the extreme value distribution; (ii) E(ǫrj |hm, hf , wm, wf , y) =
0, j = m, f, r = 0, ..., H.
The combination of working hours hkm and h
l
f is observed if two conditions are met
simultaneously. For the wife, we have
ulkf (νf ) + ǫ
l
f > u
sk
f (νf) + ǫ
s
f , s = l, s = 0, ..., H (7)
whereas for the husband
uklm(νm) + ǫ
k
m > u
rl
m(νm) + ǫ
r
m, r = k, r = 0, ..., H (8)
The parameters entering the wife’s utility ulkf (νf ) can be estimated by formulating the
probability that (7) occurs and applying maximum likelihood estimation. Denoting this
probability by plkf (νf) we get
plkf (νf ) =
exp(ulkf (νf))∑H
s=1 exp(u
sk
f (νf))
, l = 0, ..., H (9)
The probabilities add up to 1 over hours levels l = 0, ..., H. Integration over the unob-
served heterogeneity νf determines the ﬁnal expression for the probability. Similarly, we
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can estimate the parameters entering (8) based on the probabilities
pklm(νm) =
exp(uklm(νm))∑H
r=1 exp(u
rl
m(νm))
, k = 0, ..., H (10)
Also the probabilities (10) add up to 1 over the hours categories k = 0, ...,H, and we will
integrate over the unobserved heterogeneity νm. Thus, maximum likelihood estimation
can always be based on the probabilities (10) and (9). The question is whether we can
improve eﬃciency by formulating the joint probability pklmf (µm, νf) that (7) and (8) are
satisﬁed simultaneously, with
pklmf(µm, νf ) = p
kl
m(νm)p
lk
f (νf), k = 0, ...,H, l = 0, ...,H (11)
Now integration over νm and νf involves the joint distribution g(νm, νf ) of (νm, νf), unlike
in the separate expressions (9) and (10), which involve the integration over the marginal
distributions only:
pklmf =
∫ ∫
pklmf(µm, νf )g(νm, νf )dνmdνf , k = 0, ..., H, l = 0, ..., H (12)
The question is whether the outcome of (7) and (8) is unique. By uniqueness we mean
that for given values of ǫsf , s = 0, ...,H and ǫ
r
m, r = 0, ..., H the observed hours combina-
tion (hkm, h
l
f ) is the unique combination of male and female working hours that satisﬁes
(7) and (8) simultaneously. In other words, there is no other pair of working hours
(hrm, h
s
f), r = k, s = l which also satisﬁes (7) and (8) simultaneously for the same values
of the errors. To explain this issue further, let us consider (7). First note that if (7) is
satisﬁed for a given hours level hkm for certain values of ǫ
s
f , s = 0, ...,H, the outcome h
l
f
is unique. Now the question is how the wife’s optimal choice of working hours depends
on the husband’s level of working hours. Is the outcome hlf still optimal, for a diﬀerent
value of the hours of the husband, say hjm, j = k, at the same values of ǫ
s
f , s = 0, ..., H?
The answer depends on how the hours level of the husband aﬀects the utility level of the
wife. From the decision problem (5) we see that the hours level of the husband aﬀects
the wife’s utility level not by preferences, but by the sharing rule and, possibly, by the
tax system, if the tax system is such that the hours of the husband aﬀect the virtual
wage rates and non-labour income of the wife. If the utility of the wife is monotonous in
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the hours of the husband, we have a suﬃcient condition for the uniqueness of the hours
level hlf for all possible hours level of the husband, at given values of ǫ
s
f , s = 0, ..., H.
But even if at hours hjm, j = k and values of ǫ
s
f , s = 0, ...,H, hours h
s
f , s = l are optimal
for the wife, the outcome of (7) and (8) is not necessarily unique. We also need that
at given values ǫrm, r = 0, ..., H for which (8) is satisﬁed, (that is, h
k
m is optimal at h
l
f)
hjm, j = k is optimal at h
s
f , s = l, for the same j and s as above. Again, uniqueness
of the outcome hkm for arbitrary values of the wife’s hours depends on how the wife’s
hours inﬂuence the husband’s decision problem, as described in (5). From (5) we see
that wife’s hours possibly inﬂuence the husband’s utility by the virtual wage rates, and
the virtual non-labour income. So it depends on the properties of the tax system and
the shape of the sharing rule whether the outcome of (8) and (7) will be unique. Now
we could formulate suﬃcient conditions for the uniqueness of a solution, like having a
utility level that is monotonously increasing in consumption, with a convex tax system,
but empirically we may not want to impose these restrictions a priori. A consequence
of possibly having multiple solutions is that the joint probabilities in (11) and (12) may
add up to an amount larger than 1 (added up over male hours, k = 0, ..., H, and female
hours l = 0, ..., H). As a result, we cannot use the joint probability in the estimation
of the model: applying maximum likelihood will bias outcomes in the direction of the
regime where probabilities add up to values larger than one. However, we can use the
probabilities for the separate condition (10) and (9). This will come at the cost loosing
eﬃciency in the estimation. For instance, using the separate conditions (10) and (9)
precludes the estimation of a correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity νm and
νf of men and women.
3.2 The wage equation
For individuals who do not work, or individuals who do work but have missing informa-
tion on wages, the gross wage rate is not observed. We formulate the following equation
for the gross wage rate:
lnwj = η
′
jxj + vj , j = m, f (13)
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In (13) ηj is the parameter vector measuring the impact of the observed characteristics
xj on the gross wage rate, whereas vj is a random error. We assume that vj follows a
normal distribution with mean zero and covariance τ2j . For each household member we
specify a selection equation for the labour market state with an error term that is jointly
normally distributed with the error term in the wage equation (13).14 We estimated
the parameters of the wage equation and the selection equation jointly with maximum
likelihood. Note that the selection equation should include the variables included in the
utility function. Since the choice of one partner may also depend on the wage of the
other, we also include all the covariates of the partner’s wage equation in the selection
equation.
3.3 The utility function
We represent preferences by the following quadratic direct utility function:15
uklj = (β
j
0,hh + β
j
hh′zj)(ln(T − h
k
j ))
2 + βjch ln(T − h
k
j )C
kl
j + β
j
cC
kl
j +
+βjcc(C
kl
j )
2 + (βj
0h + β
j
h′zj + νj) ln(T − h
k
j ), j = m, f
(14)
In (14) zj represents a vector of observable taste shifters that may inﬂuence the prefer-
ences for leisure,16 whereas βj
0,hh, β
j
hh, β
j
ν , β
j
ch, β
j
c , β
j
cc, β
j
0,h and β
j
h are the parameters of
the utility function. T represents the total time available. It is set to 168 hours a week
in the empirical application. The utility function contains an unobserved taste shifter
νj . We allow for correlation between the unobserved taste shifter of husband and wife,
and we assume that it is normally distributed:(
νm
νf
)
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
(
σ2ν,m σν,mf
σν,mf σ
2
ν,f
))
(15)
14 Similar approaches are followed by Van Soest (1995).
15 Van Soest (1995) specifies a discrete utility function that is log-quadratic in its arguments. However,
in our model, based on the collective approach, the consumption level of a household member is equal to
his or her earnings plus the share of non-labour income, determined by the sharing rule. The intercept
of the sharing rule is (non-parametrically) not identified, since the only restriction imposed is adding-up
across household members. Consequently, the sharing rule need not be positive. Therefore we include
consumption in levels.
16 We could have made the utility specification even more flexible, by making the parameters of
consumption, βjc and β
j
cc a function of the taste shifters zj . But in the present specification, the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure already is a function of the taste shifters
zj and also making βjc and β
j
cc a function of the taste shifters zj a function of taste shifters would make
both the numerator and the denominator of the marginal rate of substitution a function of the taste
shifters, which looks like overparametrizing the model.
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We denote the density function of random preferences by g(νm, νf ; Σν), where Σν repre-
sents the covariance matrix. The covariance parameter σν,mf cannot be identiﬁed if we
use the separate probabilities (10) and (9). That is part of the eﬃciency loss we have to
incur.
It is straightforward to show that the utility function (14) is increasing in consumption
if and only if
βjch ln(T − h
k
j ) + β
j
c + 2βccC
kl
j > 0, j = m, f (16)
In the estimation, (16) is not a priori imposed, but the welfare levels are diﬃcult to
interpret as such if (16) is not satisﬁed. Therefore, in the evaluation of the model
outcomes, we abstain from drawing conclusions from the welfare levels.
Utility is increasing in leisure l = T − h if
2(βj
0,hh + β
j
hh′zj) ln(T − h
k
j ) + β
j
chg(C
kl
j ) + (β
j
0h + β
j
h′zj + νj) > 0, j = m, f (17)
Quasi-concavity is satisﬁed if
−
1
U jc
(
−
U
j
l
U
j
c
1
)
HU j
(
−
U
j
l
U
j
c
1
)′
> 0, j = m, f (18)
with U jc and U
j
l the partial derivative of utility with respect to consumption and leisure,
and HU j the hessian of the utility function with respect to consumption and leisure.
3.4 Specification of the sharing rule
In the previous section we have noticed that the sharing rule in this discrete choice
setting is not only a function of the (virtual) wage rates of husband and wife and the
(virtual) nonlabour income of the household, but is also a function of the working hours
of the husband.17 Accordingly, we specify the following sharing rule:18
ρ(ωm, ωf , hm, µ) =
α0 + α1ωmhm + α2wm + α3wf + α4µ+ α5D + α6hm + α7µ
2
(19)
17 In their model of restricted choice by the husband, Blundell et al. (2007) actually specify two
separate sharing rules for the two choice opportunities (0 or 40 hours) of the husband.
18 In the empirical application we will allow the parameters of the sharing rule to be different by
marital status.
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Note that we included the virtual labour income ωmhm of the husband. In individual
models for the labour supply of married women, the labour income of the husband
appears as an explanatory variable, usually added together with non-labour income of the
household. The present speciﬁcation therefore nests this case and links the parameters to
the husband’s choice. The variable D is a factor that represents the relative bargaining
power of husband and wife, and we specify
D =
ωm
ωm + ωf
(20)
Recall that ρ = ρm, the husband’s share, while the wife’s share follows from (19) as
ρf = µ− ρm. Moreover, by the budget constraint, Cj = ωjhj + ρj , j = m, f . Note that
a necessary condition for income pooling is 1 + α1 = α4.
Note that in the estimation of the model data on several years are used. Throughout
we assume that the parameters of the sharing rule αj remain constant across time. Thus,
we implicitly assume that there is no renegotiation on the shape of the sharing rule if the
value of any of the variables entering the sharing rule changes across time. In other words,
the marginal eﬀects of the variables aﬀecting the share remain constant. Only changes
across time in the levels of the variables aﬀect the division of income between household
members. In the empirical speciﬁcation, though, we experimented with sharing rule
parameters that change over time. We will comment on the outcomes in the results
section.
3.5 Identification
Constructing the consumption levels Cj = ωjhj+ρj , j = m, f using the sharing rule (19)
imposes parameter restrictions between the consumption levels of husband and wife. To
make these restrictions explicit, we specify the ‘reduced form’ consumption functions Xm
and Xf for husband and wife:
Xm = γ
m
1
ωmhm + γ
m
2
ωm + γ
m
3
ωf + γ
m
4
µ+ γm
5
D + γm
6
hm + γ
m
7
µ2 (21)
and
Xf = γ
f
0ωfhf + γ
f
1ωmhm + γ
f
2ωm + γ
f
3ωf + γ
f
4µ+ γ
f
5D + γ
f
6hm + γ
f
7µ
2 (22)
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Before continuing, we would like to emphasize that the purpose of this section is to shed
light on the identiﬁcation, and not to set up a speciﬁcation for the purpose of estimation.
The reduced form speciﬁcations contain too much parameters and yield, in practice, an
overparametrized model with ﬂat likelihood functions. We will therefore not test the
restrictions.
We specify the reduced form utility functions as
U∗klj = β
j
hh(ln(T − h
k
j ))
2 + βj
∗ch ln(T − h
k
j )X
kl
j + β
j
∗cX
kl
j +
+βj
∗cc(X
kl
j )
2 + (βj
0h + β
j
h′zj + νj) ln(T − h
k
j ), j = m, f
(23)
In (14) the superscript kl indicates, as before, that utility is evaluated in hours levels
hm = h
k
m and hf = h
l
f .
Let us concentrate on the parameters of the sharing rule. (For the moment we keep
the parameters of the utility function constant). We count 15 reduced from parameters:
γfl , l = 0, ..., 7 and γ
m
l , l = 1, ..., 7. The ‘structural’ sharing rule has 7 parameters:
αl, l = 1, ..., 7. We ﬁrst express the reduced form parameters in the structural parameters.
For the husband’s consumption parameters we have
γm
1
= 1 + α1, γ
m
j = αj , j = 1, ..., 7 (24)
For the wife’s consumption parameters the following restrictions hold:
γf0 = 1, γ
f
j = −αj , j = 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and γ
f
4 = 1− α4 (25)
Note that the reduced form parameter γm
1
is not identiﬁed without imposing the adding-
up restriction γm
1
+γf1 = 1. From (24), and (25) we can solve the 7 structural parameters,
and 8 cross equation restrictions:
αj = −γ
f
j , j = 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and α4 = 1− γ
f
4 (26)
and
γmj = −γ
f
j , j = 2, 3, 5, 6, 7
γmj + γ
f
j = 1, j = 1, 4, γ
f
0 = 1
(27)
Note that the restrictions imposed this way can only be estimated if we use a model
for both husbands and wives. A diﬀerent approach in the literature, see for instance,
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Vermeulen (2006), and Beninger and Laisney (2002), is uses information of women only
and identify parameters by comparing married and single women. The restrictions tested
and imposed in this approach usually are restrictions on the utility function of the wife
herself, rather than restrictions between husband and wife.
3.6 Fixed costs of work
Previous studies that use the discrete hours framework reveal that the discrete choice
model, once the parameters have been estimated, typically fails to predict the sample
fraction of non-working individuals (see Van Soest, 1995, and the remarks in Beninger
and Laisney, 2002). This led to the practice of introducing ﬁxed costs of work (see,
for instance, Van Soest and Das, 2001). Fixed costs of work are not directly observed,
but parametrized by allowing for a ﬁxed discrete diﬀerence in the consumption level
between labour market states. Suppose that the ﬁxed cost of work of household member
j (j = m, f) is Fj . To introduce ﬁxed costs we will assume that the income available
for consumption is Cj = ωjhj + ρj − Fjι(hj > 0), j = m, f . Note that we assign the
ﬁxed cost of household member j completely to the consumption of household member
j and not to the partner. This is motivated by the double indiﬀerence condition, which
implies that the sharing rule should be a continuous function of the amounts of ﬁxed
costs of both partners (i.e. the amounts should enter the sharing rule for both working
and non-working individuals). But if the amounts are ﬁxed, and if there are no variables
that aﬀect ﬁxed costs of work and not the marginal utility of working hours we cannot
identify ﬁxed costs of work from the sharing rule, as the sharing rule is identiﬁed up to
an additive constant only. Therefore, the ﬁxed costs of work only enter the individual
consumption levels.
Adding ﬁxed cost solves at least part of the misprediction of the fraction of non-
working in the discrete choice hours model. We want to emphasize that it is an ad hoc
solution, but it has become common practice in the literature on discrete hours models.19
19 In different contexts, alternatives for a fixed cost are imaginable. For instance, Bloemen (2008)
specifies a search model for unemployed job searchers, that includes working hours as a job characteristic.
In that framework, unemployment benefits as well as job offer restrictions give a very natural explanation
for observing someone with zero working hours, apart from the choice explanation. The need for adding
ad hoc fixed cost is not very strong in such a framework.
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Bloemen and Kapteyn (2008) also studied the performance of ﬁxed costs in the discrete
choice framework. In the Monte Carlo study, they ﬁnd that ﬁxed costs turn out to be
signiﬁcant, even if the underlying ‘true model’ did not contain ﬁxed costs. Therefore, we
should be careful with interpreting the estimated value of the ﬁxed costs, and we may
at best regard the introduction of ﬁxed costs as a ﬂexibilisation of the utility function.
4 The income tax system in the Netherlands
We will use information for the years 1990-2001. In the years 1990-2000 the rules of
the Dutch income tax system were basically the same. There are, though, year to
year diﬀerences in marginal tax rates and standard deductibles, which mainly represent
corrections for inﬂation. For household labour supply decisions it is important to note
that in the Dutch tax system individual incomes are taxed. Every individual has a
standard deductible:20 the marginal tax rate for any income below this amount is zero.
There is some relation between the income taxation of two partners in a household. Only
if a household member earns an income that is below the standard deductible, s/he can
transfer the amount of the standard deductible to her/his partner, who can add it to
his/her deductible. This raises household income if the partner earns more than the
deductible. Transferring the deductible to the higher income partner, if the household is
eligible for it, is the common practice among households in the Netherlands. In the years
1998 through 2000 the deductible was split up into a small non-transferable deductible21
and the transferable deductible. In 1990 through 1998 there were three tax brackets for
the income net of the deductible.22 In 1999 a fourth income tax bracket was introduced.
The marginal tax rate for the ﬁrst bracket varies from year to year, because it partly
consists of premiums for social welfare. The marginal tax rate for the two higher brackets
remained at 50% and 60% throughout the years, except for 2001, for which the values
are 42% and 52%. Table 1 shows the standard deductibles throughout the years 1990-
2000. As an example, consider the year 1997 and suppose that the wife earns less than
20 The Dutch terminology in the law is the ‘basisaftrek’.
21 The so called ‘bovenbasisaftrek’.
22 The ‘belastbare som’.
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7102 guilders a year.23 Then she may transfer the full deductible amount of 7102 to her
husband. She will then have a deductible of zero, whereas the deductible for her husband
will be 14204 guilders. The advantage for the household income as a whole is (i) that
the complete deductible amount of 7102 is exploited24 and (ii) if the husband is in the
second or third tax bracket there is an additional gain since on the margin the husband’s
income is taxed at a higher rate than the wife’s income as the tax system is progressive.
Van Soest and Das (2001) plotted the impact of transferring the deductible to the other
partner on the budget constraint for the year 1998. The shape of the budget constraint
shows a nonconvex kink at low numbers of working hours, but the nonconvexity is rather
small.
From the year 2001 on the system of deductibles changed. The standard deductible
was replaced by a system of deductibles that depend on the personal situation, like
the labour market status, presence of children in the household, households with lone
parents, households with old aged, and so on. A base deductible remained but was
lower than before. The transferability of the deductible from one partner to the other
was abolished. For working couples without children the relevant deductibles are the
base deductible and the labour market state dependent deductible. Table 1 shows these
deductibles for the year 2001, as well as the marginal tax rates for the ﬁrst two brack-
ets. Note that the introduction of the labour market state dependent deductible has
implications for the speciﬁcation of the sharing rule. The labour market state depen-
dent deductible has a similar implication as ﬁxed costs of work, as discussed previously.
Double indiﬀerence implies that the sharing rule has to be a continuous function of the
deductible amount, i.e. the deductible amount has to be included in the sharing rule
for both labour market states. Since the deductible amount is the same for everybody,
this implies that the intercept of the sharing rule is aﬀected by the introduction of the
labour market state dependent deductible. Although the intercept of the sharing rule
by itself is not identiﬁed, the intercept for the year 2001 is potentially diﬀerent from
that of the previous years. Therefore, in (19) a dummy variable for the year 2001 may
23 Note that someone can never deduct more than the value of her/his income.
24 For instance, if the wife’s income is 6000 guilders, she can only deduct these 6000.
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be included. Alternatively, we may guess that the change in the tax system leads to
rebargaining and therefore a new sharing rule, or, new values for the parameters of the
sharing rule. We will discuss the issue of time dependent sharing rule parameters in the
empirical section.25
5 The data
We use data from the Socio-Economic Panel (SEP). The SEP is a household survey
collected by Statistics Netherlands. We use data for the years 1990 to 2002. In this
period, households were interviewed on a yearly basis, every May. The income in a given
survey wave refers to the previous calendar year: the income information in the survey
is based on the income information that individuals provided to the tax administration
for determining income taxes for the previous year, which typically has to be ﬁnished
and returned to the tax authorities by April. For this reason, we link data from two
subsequent waves to get the complete information for one year. Consequently, for each
individual we have information for the years 1990 through 2001.
For each year, we selected couples living together (either married or unmarried) with-
out children, in which the male is in the age range of 22 to 60 and the female is no older
than 60.26 We excluded households in which either husband or wife reports to be self-
employed. Furthermore, we require the availability of information on the labour market
state of both household members, the non-labour income, and information on the level
of schooling and the sector of education. We use information on hourly wage rates and
employment status for the estimation of the wage equation. The pooled dataset contains
8049 observations (in which the observation unit is the two-member household).
Table 3 contains descriptive statistics for the pooled data. Note that 86.3% of the
male respondents is employed and 72.5% of their female partners. In interpreting these
numbers we should recall that we selected couples without children. Therefore, the
percentage of working females is relatively high in our sample. At the household level
we see that in 66.9% of the households both spouses are working and in 19.5% of the
25 In advance, we can say that identification of such age dependent parameters failed in practice.
26 The age of 60 was the most common age for eligibility to early retirement in the Netherlands.
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households the husband works, while the wife does not. For 8.1% of the households none
of the members is working, whereas in only 5.6% of the households only the wife works.
Note that on average the males in the sample are higher educated than the females.
We have also information about the direction, or sector, of education and here we see
some typical diﬀerences between males and females. There are few women with a tech-
nical type of education whereas the majority of the men followed a technical education.
The majority of women is educated for the service sector. There are also more women
without specialization in education. The mean age for males is about 2 years higher
than for females, which is quite common for married couples.
Mean weekly working hours for males are about 40, whereas females work 31 hours
a week on average. The male hourly wage rate is more than 2 guilders higher than the
wage rate of females. The non-labour income includes interest income, income out of
real estate, rent subsidy, income out of life insurance,27 gifts by family, dividend income
and income out of proﬁts and scholarships. In the survey it is measured on a yearly basis
and in Table 1 it is converted to guilders per week. The average is about 37 guilders
a week, and there is quite some variation in it, with some households reporting much
higher amounts, and some households reporting not to have received any non-labour
income.
We have classiﬁed working hours into intervals of 6 hours, and such that the most
prevailing working hours levels have a separate category.28 Zero working hours is treated
as a separate class. We have a somewhat diﬀerent classiﬁcation for men and women,
since there are hardly any women working more than 40 hours a week. If hkm denotes the
classiﬁed hours value for men and h is the observed value, then we classify h (for men)
as follows:
hkm = h
0
m = 0 if h = 0
hkm = 6k − 3 if 6(k − 1) < h ≤ 6k, k = 1, ..., 10
h11m = 63 if h > 60
(28)
27 ‘Lijfrente’.
28 For instance, part-time jobs of 20 hours a week and 24 hours a week (3 days) are included in
category k = 4, jobs of 4 working days a week are included in category k = 6, while full-time jobs of
38-40 hours a week are included in category k = 7.
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For women, we have the same classiﬁcation, but because of the small number of obser-
vations with a high number of working hours, we take h > 48 as the top category:
hkf = h
0
f = 0 if h = 0
hkf = 6k − 3 if 6(k − 1) < h ≤ 6k, k = 1, ..., 8
h9f = 51 if h > 48
(29)
6 Estimation results
First, the parameters of the wage equations were estimated by maximum likelihood,
using a reduced form participation equation. The procedure is described in detail in
Appendix A, and the estimates of the employment and wage equation are in the tables
A.1 and A.2. The results were used to predict wages.
During the estimation of the discrete hours model we found that the variance of the
unobserved heterogeneity for men, σµ,m, in (15) converged to zero for men.
29 Apparently
hours of men do not exhibit suﬃcient variation to be able to identify unobserved hetero-
geneity from the data, in addition to the observed characteristics included in the model.
For this reason we excluded the unobserved heterogeneity for men from the model and
the model was estimated with unobserved heterogeneity for women only.
For reasons of comparison, several versions of the model were estimated. As a ref-
erence case we took a restricted version of the sharing rule that imposes income split-
ting behaviour with regard to non-labour income and the husband’s earnings. For this
purpose we set α1 = −0.5, α4 = 0.5, αj = 0, j = 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 in the sharing rule (19)
speciﬁcation. This type of speciﬁcation is consistent with female labour supply models
that treat the husband’s earnings as a source of non-labour income to the wife.
Next, we took the more ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the sharing rule in (19), with para-
meters that vary with marital status. In addition, each variant was estimated with and
without ﬁxed costs. The results of the estimation are shown in Tables 4 through 7.
Table 4 contains the base parameters of the utility function for each speciﬁcation,
Table 5 presents the parameters of the ﬁxed costs (for the ﬁxed costs speciﬁcations),
29 This phenomenon is often found in applications of the discrete choice model of labour supply. See
Bloemen and Kapteyn (2008) for a discussion.
23
and Table 6 shows the parameters of the sharing rule (for the model variants with an
unrestricted sharing rule). Finally, Table 7 contains the parameters of the taste shifters
for each variant. Most of the parameters are not directly interpretable themselves, so we
are looking for ways to evaluate the estimation results obtained with the diﬀerent model
variants.
Since the model variants are nested, likelihood ratio test statistics seem to provide an
obvious way to compare and evaluate diﬀerent speciﬁcations. But a discrete choice labour
supply model speciﬁes probabilities of ﬁnding working hours in given hours categories,
so any ﬂexibilization of the model brings the discrete choice hours distribution implied
by the model closer to its corresponding empirical distribution function, and it will be
no surprise to ﬁnd signiﬁcantly better likelihood values for more ﬂexible speciﬁcations.
An inspection of the likelihood values showed us that this happens, indeed. Since we are
modelling household behaviour, the more relevant question is whether a more ﬂexible
model speciﬁcation implies diﬀerent choice outcomes for the household members or a
diﬀerent allocation of income between husband and wife. The wage elasticities of labour
supply provide a means of summarizing the model outcomes. The estimation of wage
elasticities is not speciﬁc to collective models of household labour supply, so results can
be compared with earlier results from the literature. Next we evaluate how the allocation
of income to husband and wife changes as a consequence of changes in husband’s and
wife’s (gross) wage rates. The outcomes are inﬂuenced by the tax system and the sharing
rule. We evaluate whether results are diﬀerent if a ﬂexible sharing rule speciﬁcation is
chosen or a restricted speciﬁcation. Finally, we simulate a change in the tax system that
is similar to the actual policy change that took place in the Netherlands in the year
2001. We will evaluate how this aﬀects the income sharing between husband and wife,
and whether diﬀerent model speciﬁcations lead to diﬀerent hours responses.
The order of the presentation of results is as follows. In sections 6.1 and 6.2 we will
brieﬂy discuss the parameter estimates themselves. Section 6.3 presents wage elasticities
of labour supply. In section 6.4 we discuss marginal eﬀects of husband’s and wife’s wage
rates on the allocation of income. Section 6.5 presents results of the simulation with the
tax system.
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6.1 Parameter estimates: the taste shifters
Before discussing the more fundamental results, we take a look at the taste shifters.
Tables 7a through 7d contain the estimates. We comment on the two speciﬁcations
with an unrestricted sharing rule. The parameter estimates are hard to interpret by
themselves, but their impact becomes clear once we realize how they aﬀect the marginal
utility of leisure. The base parameters of the marginal utility of leisure are βj
0,hh and
βj
0h, j = m, f (see Table 4). The parameters in Table 7 show the deviations from this
base. We computed the marginal utility of leisure for working hours levels of 40 for men
and 32 for women (which correspond to the average levels of working hours for employed
men and women).
For men, the marginal utility of leisure decreases with the level of education. The
coeﬃcients measuring the eﬀect of the wife’s education level on the husband’s marginal
utility leisure are not all estimated precisely, but the impact is U-shaped: both men with
a low educated wife and men with a highly educated wife attach more weight to leisure.
Married men have a lower marginal utility of leisure, but the eﬀect of marital status is
much stronger for the variant without ﬁxed costs. Note, though, that marital status is
also included as a regressor in the ﬁxed costs.
For women the marginal utility of leisure increases with the husband’s level of educa-
tion, whereas it is higher for low educated women. The impact of marital status diﬀers
between the speciﬁcations with and without ﬁxed costs. The latter speciﬁcation shows a
higher marginal utility of leisure for married women, while the eﬀect is reversed, though
not strongly, in the speciﬁcation with ﬁxed cost.
The estimates of the age coeﬃcients imply, for the speciﬁcation without ﬁxed costs,
that the marginal utility of leisure of both men and women increases with the age (at
average age levels) of both husband and wife. The impact of the individual’s own age is
much stronger, though, especially for women. The speciﬁcation with ﬁxed costs reveals
that the marginal utility of leisure of men decreases with age. Note, however, that age is
also included as a regressor in the ﬁxed costs, showing that ﬁxed costs of men increase
with age (see Table 5).
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6.2 Parameter estimates: preferences and the sharing rule
Table 6 shows the parameter estimates of the sharing rule. Since the parameters rep-
resent marginal eﬀects of virtual wage rates, earnings, and non-labour income, not all
parameters are directly interpretable, and in section 6.4 we will therefore discuss simu-
lation results of changes in gross wage rates on the share. For both the variant without
ﬁxed costs and the variant with ﬁxed costs, the parameter of the husband’s earnings, α1,
is smaller than -0.5, irrespective of the marital status. This suggests that, in general,
husbands transfer part of their earnings to their wives. We also see that unmarried men
transfer a larger share of their earnings to their partners than married men. Something
similar is happening for non-labour income: within each model speciﬁcation, unmar-
ried men transfer more of their non-labour income to their partner than married men.
This suggests that married women are in a worse bargaining position than unmarried
women.30 Between the speciﬁcation without ﬁxed costs and with ﬁxed costs, there is
a diﬀerence in the impact of non-labour income: men get a higher share of non-labour
income in the ﬁxed costs speciﬁcation. Possibly non-labour income aﬀects participation
in the speciﬁcation without costs, a role which may be taken over by the ﬁxed costs
in the ﬁxed costs speciﬁcation. More light on this will be shed in the computation of
elasticities and in the simulations, described in the next sections. In all speciﬁcations we
ﬁnd that male working hours have a positive eﬀect on the husband’s share, suggesting
that men are in a more favourable position if they work more. The husband’s wage rate,
expressed as a share of the sum of both partner’s wage rates, D, is never signiﬁcant and
always estimated with a large standard error.31
30 Qualitatively these findings are not dissimilar to the results by Bloemen (2009), who also finds, with
an entirely different model specification without taxes, that husbands transfer income to their wives,
and that unmarried women get a larger share of non-labour income than married women.
31 To check whether the sharing rule may have been overparametrized, we have estimated a model
variant which excluded the levels of the male and female virtual wage rate, but still kept the wage
rate ratio (as an expression of relative bargaining power). In these specifications the wage rate ratio
D was significant, but the wage elasticities of working hours and participation changed in magnitude,
compared to the more flexible sharing rule, leading to the conclusion that this specification was overly
restrictive.
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6.3 Elasticities
To evaluate whether diﬀerent model speciﬁcations generate diﬀerent outcomes, wage
elasticities of working hours were computed. To this purpose, a simulation was run that
increased the gross wage rates of, subsequently, men and women, by 1%. Working hours
of men and women were simulated from their joint distribution (12)32 before and after the
simulated wage increase. A similar simulation was run for non-labour income. Table 8
displays the results. The table shows elasticities of both working hours (including zeros)33
and participation.34 Comparing the variants without ﬁxed costs (with a restricted and
a ﬂexible sharing rule speciﬁcation), elasticities of working hours for men are somewhat
diﬀerent, but not that much. The ﬂexible sharing rule estimates a positive signiﬁcant own
wage elasticity for men, while this elasticity is not estimated precisely for the restricted
sharing rule variant. The unrestricted sharing rule exposes a lower sensitivity of male
working hours to non-labour income, but in both cases the eﬀect of non-labour income
is signiﬁcantly negative. A higher wage rate of the wife leads to less working hours
for the husband. The restricted sharing rule shows a signiﬁcantly positive and sizeable
eﬀect of the husband’s own wage on participation, which disappears for the more ﬂexible
speciﬁcation of the sharing rule. For women, both variants without ﬁxed costs show
positive and signiﬁcant own wage eﬀects of similar size, both for working hours and
for participation. For working hours, the ﬂexible sharing rule speciﬁcation predicts a
negative impact of the husband’s wage rate on the wife’s working hours, which we do not
ﬁnd for the restricted sharing rule. For both variants, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects
of non-labour income on the wife’s working hours and participation. The elasticities
shown here are for the sample as a whole. Splitting up by marital status would exhibit
heterogeneity in the impact of non-labour income by marital status, as can be derived
from the diﬀerent parameters of non-labour income by marital status. Comparing the
variants with ﬁxed costs with each other shows larger diﬀerences between the restricted
sharing rule and the ﬂexible variant. None of the hours and participation elasticities of
32 Adding up to one was imposed by normalizing the probabilities by the sum of the probabilities
over all hours categories.
33 In the American literature referred to as the ‘intensive and extensive margin’.
34 The ‘extensive margin’ only.
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men are estimated precisely for the ﬂexible variant, while for the restricted variant we
do ﬁnd some signiﬁcant eﬀects. Also the women’s own wage elasticities of working hours
and participation are diﬀerent. The restricted sharing rule with ﬁxed costs is the only
model variant that ﬁnds a small and insigniﬁcant elasticity of the wife’s own wage on her
working hours, whereas also the wage elasticity of participation is much smaller than for
the other variants. From this we may conclude that the model variant with ﬁxed costs
in combination with the restricted sharing rule is too constrained.
Comparing the variants without ﬁxed costs and with costs for the ﬂexible sharing
rule speciﬁcation, the most noticeable diﬀerence is the complete insensitivity of male
working hours and participation for the ﬁxed costs speciﬁcation. However, it may be
noted that for all variants, the husband’s elasticities are small in magnitude, even though
the values are signiﬁcant sometimes. For the women, the own wage elasticities of working
hours and participation are of comparable size, irrespective of the inclusion of ﬁxed costs.
There are some diﬀerences in the husband’s cross wage eﬀects, though. In the ﬁxed costs
speciﬁcation, the wife’s working hours are less sensitive to the husband’s wage rate, and
the eﬀect is also less precise. On the contrary, there is a small positive eﬀect of the
husband’s wage rate on the wife’s participation for the ﬁxed costs speciﬁcation.
To compare the values of the elasticities with results obtained in the literature, ﬁrst
note that there are more results in the literature on labour supply elasticities for females
than for males. Van Soest, Woittiez, and Kapteyn (1990) estimated a wage elasticity
of female labour supply of 0.45. Bloemen and Kapteyn (2008) estimate various model
variants. Their variants based on simulated scores and on a ﬂexible discrete choice model
with a third order utility function on average show wage elasticities of working hours and
participation of 0.42 and 0.25. Van Soest (1995) estimates a discrete choice family labour
supply model without ﬁxed costs. He ﬁnds male’s own wage elasticities of around 0.10,
female’s own wage elasticities of around 0.50, cross elasticities of the husband’s wage rate
on the wife’s working hours in the range of -0.10 to -0.05, and cross elasticities of the
wife’s wage rate on the husband working hours of around -0.03. The studies mentioned
all ﬁnd somewhat higher own wage elasticities of the wife’s working hours than we do.
All the studies mentioned so far use data from the eighties for married women, when
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there was a diﬀerent tax system with 10 to 11 income brackets. Bloemen (2009) ﬁnds for
data from the nineties within the context of a collective regression model without taxes
but with net wage rates, own wage elasticities of men that vary with marital status but
are on average around 0.09, women’s owns wage elasticities ranging from 0.22 to 0.60,
depending on marital status, cross elasticities of the wife’s wage rate on the husband’s
working hours of around 0.05, and negative cross wage elasticities of the husband’s wage
rate on the wife’s labour supply of around -0.15. The wage elasticity values in Table 6
do not look unreasonable given this range of values from the literature. In general,
less information is available about the sensitivity of working hours and participation
with respect to non-labour income. Van Soest (1995) found for the working hours of
men negative (median) values around -0.03. We ﬁnd values closer to zero, but always
negative for men. For women, he ﬁnds (median) values ranging from -0.009 to 0.008,
depending on the model speciﬁcation. Here, we also ﬁnd sometimes positive values of
the same order of magnitude. Bloemen (2009) addresses heterogeneity by marital status
and ﬁnds negative values for unmarried women and positive values for married women.
6.4 Implications for income sharing
The implementation of a collective labour supply model provides the opportunity to
obtain results about the sharing of income between partners within a household. To
make the models’ implications for income sharing visible, Table 9 records the percentage
households with increases in the consumption (=income) of the husband, the consump-
tion of the wife, and the husband’s share (set by the sharing rule) as a result of increases
in gross wage rates of the husband, the wife, or an increase in the household’s non-labour
income. Table 9a records the results for the speciﬁcations with the restricted sharing
rule, while Table 9b shows the results with the ﬂexible sharing rule. To obtain the re-
sults of a 1% increase in the gross wage of, say, the husband, all wages in the sample
were increased by 1%. We simulated the joint labour supply of husband and wife before
and after this wage increase.35 Thus, the outcomes include both marginal eﬀects, as for
35 This way, we simulated for each individual in the sample 12500 different values of working for
husband and wife.
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instance measured by the parameters of the sharing rule, and the eventual behavioural
changes in the working hours and participation.
Upon a wage increase of the husband, both variants with the restricted sharing rule
show that almost all husbands in unmarried couples experience an increase in their
consumption level. The same holds for married couples, but for the ﬁxed costs variant
10% of the husbands does not experience an increase in consumption.36 The ﬂexible
sharing rules in Table 9b lead to diﬀerent conclusions. The variant without ﬁxed costs
shows a larger minority of around 12% of married and unmarried men that does not
experience an increase in consumption upon an increase in the wage rate. For the
variant with ﬁxed costs, the results vary even more. Less than 4% of the unmarried men
experiences an increase in consumption, whereas the percentage is 75% for married men:
the diﬀerence between the unmarried and the married is much more pronounced for
this variant. The variants with the ﬂexible sharing rule suggest that almost all women
experience an increase in consumption, irrespective of marital status and irrespective of
whether or not ﬁxed costs are included. For the restricted sharing rule, there is a larger
minority of women that does not experience an increase in consumption due the increase
in their husband’s wage rate.
Also an increase in the wife’s wage rate shows diﬀerences across speciﬁcations. For all
speciﬁcations, the majority of women experience an increase in their consumption level
as a result of an increase in their wage rate. In the ﬂexible speciﬁcations, the husbands
experience in general more often consumption increases, although there is a sizeable
minority of 20 to 30% of men that do not experience an increase in consumption. An
exception is the group of married men for the ﬂexible speciﬁcation without costs, for
which the consumption of only 11% increases.
The increase in non-labour shows an increase in the consumption of almost all men and
for the majority of women for the speciﬁcation with the restricted sharing rule. For the
unrestricted sharing rule the results are quite diﬀerent. The speciﬁcation without ﬁxed
costs predicts that both married and unmarried men almost all experience a decrease in
consumption, whereas almost all women, irrespective of marital status, see an increase
36 The fixed costs depend on marital status.
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in their consumption level. The variant with ﬁxed costs reveals considerable variation by
marital status. Unmarried men do not beneﬁt from the increase in non-labour income,
only the women do, whereas in married couples both men and women experience an
increase in consumption. This heterogeneity by marital status somehow resembles results
in Bloemen (2009), who found that married women did not beneﬁt from the increase
in non-labour income, whereas unmarried women did, suggesting a better bargaining
position for unmarried women than for married women.
Table 9 also shows the eﬀects on the share of the husband.37 An increase in the
husband’s wage rate only increases the husband’s share in a minority of the cases, whereas
an increase in the wife’s wage rate increases the husband’s share more often. What
matters most, though, is the change in total consumption which was discussed above.
For changes in non-labour income the diﬀerences between the restricted sharing rule and
the ﬂexible sharing rule are most pronounced. For the restricted sharing rule, based on
splitting of non-labour income, the share of the husband increases for almost all men.
The ﬂexible sharing rule speciﬁcation predicts that an increase in non-labour income
hardly increases the share of unmarried men. For married men the share increases for
the majority of men according to the ﬁxed costs speciﬁcation.38 Finally, note that the
results in Table 9 only address the incidence of the direction of consumption changes,
and reveal nothing about the relative size. The relative size cannot be determined, as
the level of the sharing rule cannot be identiﬁed.39
6.5 Simulating the tax reform
To show the implications of using diﬀerent speciﬁcations for policy change predictions,
the eﬀects of a counterfactual policy change in the tax system were simulated. First,
the tax system of the year 2000 was applied to every observation in the sample and the
working hours of husband and wife were generated from its joint distribution. Next, the
37 Note that the change in the share of the wife due to a change in a wage rate is not automatically
the opposite of the change in the share of the husband, as changes in wage rates may shift workers to
different tax brackets and therefore the value of the virtual non-labour income may change as well.
38 Again, it can be noted that this result is similar to the result in Bloemen (2009), obtained with an
entirely different model specification without taxes.
39 Chiappori (1988).
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simulation was repeated, but now with the tax rules of the year 2001. The policy change
in 2001 was described in Section 4. Marginal tax rates stayed the same according to this
policy change, but tax allowances partly became labour market state speciﬁc to stimulate
participation, opportunities to transfer deductible to the higher income partner were
reduced, and the bounds of tax brackets changed. A priori it is expected that this policy
change stimulates participation, notably for women. The collective model speciﬁcations
can not only be used to predict the eﬀects of the policy change on working hours and
participation, but can also shed light on the implications of the policy change for the
income sharing within households.
Table 10 shows the outcomes of the simulation for consumption and the share. It
shows the percentage40 with increases in the consumption of husband and the wife,
and the share of the husband and the wife due to changing the properties of the tax
system. A diﬀerence between the speciﬁcations with the restricted sharing rule on the
one hand and the ﬂexible speciﬁcation on the other, is that the restricted rule assigns a
consumption increase to almost all women, irrespective of marital status. The ﬂexible
sharing rule without ﬁxed costs is the only speciﬁcation that predicts an increase in
consumption for almost all men. The ﬂexible sharing rule speciﬁcation with ﬁxed costs
predicts that about the same percentage of unmarried men and women (not necessarily
within the same household) experiences a consumption increase, whereas a majority of
married women and a minority of married men experiences an increase in consumption.
All variants, except for the ﬂexible speciﬁcation without ﬁxed costs, show hardly any
increase in the share of the husband. The ﬂexible speciﬁcation with ﬁxed costs shows
that married women do better than unmarried women in terms of consumption.
The results show that the variants with the restricted sharing rule overestimate the
positive impact of the policy change for the income of women. The ﬂexible sharing
rule speciﬁcations incorporate that husbands assign income to their wives. Since the
policy change may reduce deductibles for husbands more than for wives, less income is
transferred to the wives for model variants with the ﬂexible sharing rule. Since income
allocation to married women is lower than to unmarried women due to a less favourable
40 Per household 12500 replications were done.
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bargaining position for married women, as shown by the coeﬃcients of the sharing rule
in Table 6, married women are less aﬀected by the decrease in men’s deductibles. Thus,
we see that an overly restricted model that does not take into account the bargaining
eﬀects of wages and non-labour income on the introhousehold income allocation process,
leads to wrong conclusions about the eﬀects of the tax policy change for the position of
women.
Table 11 shows the eﬀects of the policy change on working hours (including zeros)
and participation. It shows the change in the average number of working hours a week,
and the change in participation expressed in percentage points. The ﬁxed costs speciﬁca-
tions show in general a lower response in terms of working hours than the speciﬁcations
without ﬁxed costs. The unrestricted sharing rule with ﬁxed costs shows the smallest
response of male participation and working hours, in accordance with the low male elas-
ticity estimates for this variant. In general, married women show more response than
unmarried women to the change in the tax rule. On average, married women are lower
educated and less often employed than unmarried women, so for them tax incentives
for stimulating participation and abolishing the transferability of the tax allowance to
the higher income partner is likely to be more eﬀective. Comparing the results of all
the speciﬁcations, also taking into account the results in the previous subsections, we
can conclude that the restricted sharing rule speciﬁcations place too heavy restrictions
on the behavioural outcomes for the households. If we compare the two ﬂexible sharing
rule speciﬁcations, with and without ﬁxed costs, the impression is that the ﬁxed costs
speciﬁcation is not only more ﬂexible, but also generates more plausible outcomes in
terms of behaviour. According to this speciﬁcation men hardly change their labour sup-
ply behaviour, while average weekly working hours of unmarried and married women
increase by 0.4 and 1.6 hours, and participation of unmarried and married women in-
creases by 0.5 and 5.1 percentage points. Bosch and Van der Klaauw (2009) did a policy
evaluation study after the eﬀects of the tax policy change in 2001, using administrative
data about female working hours and participation before and after the policy change.
They record increases in female participation rates in the range of 3 to 6 percentage
points, comparable to the numbers in Table 11, and ﬁnd an increase in average weekly
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working hours of 0.36. This is close to the simulated increase in working hours for un-
married women reported in Table 11 but somewhat smaller than the simulated increase
for married women. Note, though, that our sample only includes women without chil-
dren. Households with children beneﬁt in the 2001 tax system from an additional tax
allowance that is not labour market state dependent, and this may reduce the sensitivity
to the policy change for women with children.
7 Conclusions
We estimated a discrete hours choice model that incorporated income taxation, individ-
ual preferences, and income sharing between partners. The identiﬁcation of the sharing
rule parameters was achieved by using data on both men and women within couples.
We estimated model speciﬁcations with a restricted sharing mechanism, implying that
the husband’s earnings are pooled together with the household’s non-labour income in
the female’s labour market decision, and a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation, that allows for a
role of individual wage rates in bargaining. We also estimated variants with and without
ﬁxed costs of work.
We evaluated the variants by analyzing behavioural outcomes, like elasticities and
income allocation between partners. More restricted speciﬁcations do not always lead to
diﬀerent conclusions for female own wage elasticities of working hours and participation:
three of the four speciﬁcations show similar values. The most notable diﬀerences are
found for the income allocation between partners. Flexible speciﬁcations show a higher
tendency of husbands to assign an increase in their wage rate or in the household’s non-
labour income to their wives. Also the diﬀerence between married couples and unmarried
couples is more pronounced, and it seems as if unmarried women have a stronger position
in the income allocation process than married women.41
We simulated the eﬀects of a tax reform, introduced in the year 2001. The reform
creates additional incentives for participation, especially for (lower income) woman. The
speciﬁcations with the restrictive sharing rule overestimate the income assignment eﬀects
41 This results is consistent with an entirely different approach, followed by Bloemen (2009).
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for women. These restricted rules ignore that the husbands, of which the majority is
employed, are more likely to be confronted with a lower virtual non-labour income, which
reduces their assignment of income to their wives. It turns out that men are not that bad
oﬀ, and women are not as well oﬀ as initially expected, once this mechanism is taken into
account. The ﬂexible sharing rule also shows heterogeneity in the outcomes by marital
status. Since married women are on average less often employed and, in the old tax
system, more often transfer their tax deductibility to their higher income husband, they
are eﬀected more than unmarried women by the tax incentives in terms of increased
labour market participation and increased consumption. Their less favourable position
in income allocation now works to their advantage, because the marginal eﬀect of the
decrease in their husbands’ earnings on the income allocation to the wife is smaller. Over
all, we ﬁnd that the most ﬂexible speciﬁcation, which has both a ﬂexible sharing rule
and allows ﬁxed costs, gives the most plausible results.
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Table 1: The Dutch tax system: standard deductible
amount and marginal tax rate 1st bracket
Year transferable non-transferable marginal tax
amount amount rate 1st bracket
1990 4568 0 31.5%
1991 4660 0 35.75%
1992 5225 0 38.55%
1993 5769 0 38.4%
1994 5925 0 38.125%
1995 6074 0 37.65%
1996 7003 0 37.5%
1997 7102 0 37.3%
1998 8207 410 36.35%
1999 8380 419 35.75%/
/37.05%
2000 8523 427 33.9%/
/37.95%
base deductible labour deductible:
2001 3473 2027 32.35%/
37.60%/
Amounts in Dutch Guilders
Marginal tax rates of the 2nd and 3rd bracket: 50% and 60%
1999/2000: ﬁrst bracket split in two
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Table 2: Bracket bounds for
income minus standard deductible
Year upper bound 1st bracket upper bound 2nd bracket
= lower bound 2nd bracket = lower bound 3rd bracket
1990 42123 84245
1991 42966 85930
1992 42966 85930
1993 43267 86532
1994 43267 86532
1995 44349 88696
1996 45325 92773
1997 45960 97422
1998 47184 103774
1999 15000/48175 105954
2000 15255/48994 107756
2001 32769/59520 102052
from 1999 on: 1st bracket split up in two
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Table 3: descriptive statistics of the pooled data: 8049 observations
Variable Husband Wife
Employment status
Employed 84.5% 70.3%
Not Employed 15.5% 29.7%
Education level
Primary 7.3% 11.2%
Lower vocational 16.0% 23.4%
Intermediate 49.3% 42.5%
Higher Vocational 20.0% 18.2%
University degree 7.0% 4.4%
Education sector
Technical 34.4% 5.3%
Economic/administrative 25.9% 24.5%
General (not specialized) 18.1% 30.2%
Services 21.5% 40.0%
Weekly working hours
# Observations n=6618 n=5408
Mean 39.4 30.9
(Standard deviation) (7.9) (10.8)
Hourly gross wage rates
# Observations n=6100 n=5029
Mean (Guilders) 30.2 24.7
(Standard deviation) (10.0) (8.4)
Age
Mean 40.8 38.7
(Standard deviation) (12.4) (12.5)
Household level variables
Non-labour income
Household level, weekly
Mean (guilders) 37.7
Standard deviation (94.8)
Employment status
Both partners working 64.3%
Husband working, wife not 20.2%
Wife working, husband not 6.0%
Both not working 9.5%
Marital status
Married 69.1%
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Table 4: Estimates of the utility parameters
Model variant:
Restricted Unrestricted
sharing rule: sharing rule
income splitting
without with without with
ﬁxed ﬁxed ﬁxed ﬁxed
parameter, variable costs costs costs costs
Parameters Husband
βm
0,hh, ln(1− hm)
2 37.06** 32.43** 32.02** 55.91**
(2.16) (2.53) (2.24) (5.06)
βmch, ln(T − hm)Cm 137.99** 190.47** 167.58** 189.79**
(2.31) (3.16) (7.79) (12.68)
βmc , Cm -704.65** -982.27** -876.04** -958.18**
(12.63) (16.88) (42.45) (63.93)
βmcc , C
2
m 34.87** 67.06** 45.53** 61.51**
(0.81) (1.47) (4.09) (7.97)
βm
0h, ln(T − hm) -50.85** -64.56** -98.52** -40.47**
(2.68) (2.95) (10.28) (12.62)
Parameters Wife
βf
0,hh, ln(T − hf )
2 8.54** 18.96* 12.42** 11.59**
(1.77) (2.37) (1.82) (2.05)
βfch, ln(T − hf )Cf 46.42** 57.03** 50.72** 53.41**
(1.39) (1.76) (1.38) (1.73)
βfc , Cf -239.83** -299.33** -261.23** -278.56**
(7.53) (9.52) (7.46) (9.43)
βfcc, C
2
f 6.93** 9.08** 7.25** 7.81**
(0.24) (0.38) (0.26) (0.36)
βf
0h, ln(T − hf) -28.32** -60.14** -27.54** -45.75**
(2.46) (2.98) (3.79) (4.66)
**: signiﬁcant at 5% level, *: 10% level
Consumption divided by 1000, parameter values adjusted accordingly
39
Table 5: Estimates of the ﬁxed costs parameters
Model variant:
Restricted Unrestricted
sharing rule: sharing rule
parameter, variable income splitting
Parameters Husband
Fm, Fixed Cost, intercept 142.21** -244.54**
(21.80) (45.52)
Fm, ln(age husband/17) -590.50** 463.47**
(60.84) (80.54)
Fm, ln(age husband/17)
2 564.12** -47.79
(35.70) (44.93)
Fm, marital status -39.52** 18.93
(8.65) (18.79)
Parameters Wife
Ff , Fixed Cost, intercept -556.89** -204.99**
(60.66) (60.90)
Ff , ln(age wife/17) 696.99** -236.71
(166.63) (177.23)
Ff , ln(age wife/17)
2 -117.74 438.98**
(100.71) (111.93)
Ff , marital status 22.29 -29.31
(25.83) (26.96)
**: signiﬁcant at 5% level, *: 10% level
Fixed costs in units of 1000 Guilders
40
Table 6: Estimates of the sharing rule
Model variant
without with
ﬁxed ﬁxed
costs costs
parameter, variable
Unmarried Unmarried
α1, ωmhm -0.96** -1.06**
(0.05) (0.03)
α2, ωm 2.03 -8.39**
(1.52) (1.47)
α3, ωf 5.86** 7.76**
(1.34) (1.48)
α4, µ -0.78** -0.04
(0.07) (0.04)
α5, D 16.03 -0.87
(118.51) (132.28)
α6, hm 15.33** 12.73**
(0.98) (1.02)
α7, µ
2/1000 0.59** -0.16**
(0.06) (0.03)
Married Married
α1, ωmhm -0.59** -0.75**
(0.03) (0.03)
α2, ωm 0.30 -4.23**
(0.71) (0.96)
α3, ωf -1.78** 0.51
(0.84) (0.96)
α4, µ -0.10** 0.40**
(0.02) (0.05)
α5, D -104.32 -1.47
(110.57) (121.71)
α6, hm 12.16** 7.93**
(0.75) (0.85)
α7, µ
2/1000 0.08** -0.22**
(0.02) (0.04)
**: signiﬁcant at 5% level, *: 10% level
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Table 7a: Estimates of the ‘structural model’
The taste shifters, husband: parameters βmhh
Model variant:
Restricted Unrestricted
sharing rule: sharing rule
income splitting
without with without with
ﬁxed ﬁxed ﬁxed ﬁxed
parameter, variable costs costs costs costs
ln(age husband/17) -44.28** -10.11 -10.66 -61.76**
(8.66) (9.56) (9.00) (13.08)
ln(age husband/17) squared 42.84** 10.37 9.96* 39.84**
(5.31) (6.01) (5.53) (7.02)
ln(age wife/17) 11.84 6.22 6.50 2.03
(7.44) (7.58) (7.72) (7.86)
ln(age wife/17) squared -8.19 -4.62 -6.86 -2.54
(4.79) (4.86) (4.99) (5.07)
education level husband 1 -0.36 4.71** 7.73** 7.83**
(1.09) (1.11) (1.12) (1.12)
education level husband 2 -3.28** 1.85** 5.55** 5.10**
(0.89) (0.90) (0.93) (0.93)
education level husband 3 -3.80** -0.12 2.22** 2.11**
(0.63) (0.63) (0.65) (0.65)
education level wife 1 -2.13** -0.92 0.41 0.11
(1.05) (1.08) (1.08) (1.08)
education level wife 2 -3.36** -2.73** -1.20 -1.72
(0.85) (0.85) (0.88) (0.88)
education level wife 3 -2.34** -2.23** -0.32 -0.87
(0.69) (0.70) (0.72) (0.73)
married -1.01 1.21 -10.60** -0.27
(0.74) (0.88) (1.23) (0.97)
**: signiﬁcant at 5% level, *: 10% level
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Table 7b: Estimates of the ‘structural model’ parameters
The taste shifters husband: parameters βmh
Model variant:
Restricted Unrestricted
sharing rule: sharing rule
income splitting
without with without with
ﬁxed ﬁxed ﬁxed ﬁxed
parameter, variable costs costs costs costs
ln(age husband/17) -34.72** -51.80** -47.94** -44.27**
(7.30) (7.79) (7.40) (8.37)
ln(age husband/17) squared 13.07** 32.76** 31.41** 23.60**
(4.63) (4.90) (4.66) (4.98)
ln(age wife/17) -12.80** -3.93 0.06 4.26
(6.10) (6.40) (6.32) (6.45)
ln(age wife/17) squared 10.14** 4.84 2.21 0.12
(4.04) (4.22) (4.17) (4.29)
education level husband 1 4.03** 0.12 -1.76* -1.44
(1.00) (1.02) (1.00) (1.03)
education level husband 2 4.08** 0.34 -2.27** -1.69**
(0.81) (0.82) (0.79) (0.80)
education level husband 3 2.83** -0.20 -1.12** -0.58
(0.54) (0.55) (0.53) (0.54)
education level wife 1 4.08** 2.72** 2.04** 1.81
(0.94) (0.96) (0.96) (0.97)
education level wife 2 3.07** 1.99** 1.28* 1.06
(0.71) (0.72) (0.72) (0.73)
education level wife 3 1.71** 0.88 0.00 -0.24
(0.55) (0.56) (0.56) (0.57)
married 0.76 -1.61** -2.10** 0.27
(0.58) (0.67) (0.77) (0.93)
**: signiﬁcant at 5% level, *: 10% level
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Table 7c: Estimates of the ‘structural model’
The taste shifters, wife: parameters βfhh
Model variant:
Restricted Unrestricted
sharing rule: sharing rule
income splitting
without with without with
ﬁxed ﬁxed ﬁxed ﬁxed
parameter, variable costs costs costs costs
ln(age husband/17) 19.82** 30.08** 19.60** 31.08**
(6.92) (6.94) (7.09) (6.85)
ln(age husband/17) squared -13.11** -18.00** -11.95** -17.57**
(4.19) (4.17) (4.32) (4.12)
ln(age wife/17) -7.04 -30.61** -15.54** -9.54
(5.61) (6.97) (5.79) (6.51)
ln(age wife/17) squared 7.73 16.03** 12.13** 2.81
(3.63) (4.19) (3.79) (4.22)
education level husband 1 -3.00** -2.74** -2.67** -3.28**
(0.76) (0.76) (0.79) (0.80)
education level husband 2 -1.60** -1.77** -1.76** -2.45**
(0.63) (0.62) (0.65) (0.65)
education level husband 3 -1.57** -1.57** -1.75 -2.13**
(0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.50)
education level wife 1 -0.67 -0.15 -0.71 -0.39
(0.77) (0.75) (0.80) (0.76)
education level wife 2 0.04 0.13 -0.27 -0.24
(0.64) (0.62) (0.66) (0.63)
education level wife 3 -1.41** -1.25** -1.80** -1.58**
(0.56) (0.54) (0.57) (0.55)
married 0.29 -0.49 -0.19 -0.46
(0.59) (0.80) (0.60) (0.79)
**: signiﬁcant at 5% level, *: 10% level
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Table 7d: Estimates of the ‘structural model’ parameters
The taste shifters, wife: parameters βfh
Model variant:
Restricted Unrestricted
sharing rule: sharing rule
income splitting
without with without with
ﬁxed ﬁxed ﬁxed ﬁxed
parameter, variable costs costs costs costs
ln(age husband/17) -25.88** -28.20** -29.50** -33.85**
(6.91) (6.91) (6.86) (6.88)
ln(age husband/17) squared 17.13** 18.43** 18.48** 21.34**
(4.32) (4.34) (4.34) (4.34)
ln(age wife/17) -45.68** -15.37** -49.47** -36.38**
(5.69) (6.21) (5.81) (6.20)
ln(age wife/17) squared 41.47** 24.52** 45.62** 38.99**
(3.81) (4.05) (3.90) (4.11)
education level husband 1 7.00** 6.17** 6.98** 6.77**
(1.07) (1.09) (1.11) (1.12)
education level husband 2 2.23** 1.98** 2.66** 2.63**
(0.71) (0.71) (0.71) (0.72)
education level husband 3 1.47** 1.31** 1.70** 1.74**
(0.54) (0.53) (0.54) (0.55)
education level wife 1 7.39** 7.03** 7.42** 6.81**
(0.93) (0.95) (0.95) (0.95)
education level wife 2 3.78** 4.18** 4.14** 3.79**
(0.70) (0.70) (0.71) (0.71)
education level wife 3 2.74** 3.10** 3.11** 2.74**
(0.58) (0.57) (0.58) (0.59)
married 1.83** 2.46** 2.77** 2.07**
(0.54) (0.68) (0.58) (0.68)
**: signiﬁcant at 5% level, *: 10% level
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Table 8: Elasticities of working hours and participation
Model variant:
Restricted Unrestricted
sharing rule: sharing rule
income splitting
without with without with
ﬁxed ﬁxed ﬁxed ﬁxed
costs costs costs costs
Working hours husband:
wage rate husband 0.045 -0.025 0.071** 0.002
(0.056) (0.049) (0.028) (0.048)
wage rate wife -0.090** -0.053** -0.112** 0.006
(0.005) (0.003) (0.023) (0.015)
non-labour income -0.013** -0.006** -0.007** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Participation husband:
wage rate husband 0.301** 0.029 0.028 -0.017
(0.044) (0.039) (0.026) (0.038)
wage rate wife -0.034** -0.022** -0.104** -0.002
(0.005) (0.002) (0.023) (0.012)
non-labour income -0.003** -0.002* -0.007** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Working hours wife:
wage rate husband -0.033 -0.026 -0.150** -0.056
(0.039) (0.035) (0.028) (0.038)
wage rate wife 0.248** 0.036 0.230** 0.256**
(0.042) (0.045) (0.057) (0.056)
non-labour income -0.002 0.001 -0.008 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Participation wife:
wage rate husband 0.067*** 0.076** 0.005 0.107**
(0.036) (0.031) (0.025) (0.038)
wage rate wife 0.377** 0.144** 0.377** 0.309**
(0.033) (0.037) (0.043) (0.041)
non-labour income 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.008*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
**: signiﬁcant at 5% level, *: 10% level
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Table 9a: Eﬀects of changes in wage rates and non-labour income
on consumption, the sharing rule, and utility
Restricted sharing rule
Variant: Restricted sharing rule, no ﬁxed costs
percentage 1% increase 1% increase 1 guilder
with gross wage gross wage increase
increase rate husband rate wife non-labour
in: income
unmarried subsample
consumption husband 99.6 29.3 99.5
consumption wife 86.2 91.7 66.9
share (husband) 11.2 27.0 100.0
married subsample
consumption husband 100.0 47.9 99.9
consumption wife 95.2 93.5 82.5
share (husband) 12.9 67.4 99.6
Variant: Restricted sharing rule, ﬁxed costs
percentage 1% increase 1% increase 1 guilder
with gross wage gross wage increase
positive rate husband rate wife non-labour
change in: income
unmarried subsample
consumption husband 98.3 39.5 99.9
consumption wife 95.4 96.8 79.1
share (husband) 26.4 55.5 100.0
married subsample
consumption husband 90.5 41.9 99.9
consumption wife 85.2 92.4 86.7
share (husband) 35.8 63.6 99.0
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Table 9b: Eﬀects of changes in wage rates and non-labour income
on consumption, the sharing rule, and utility
Flexible sharing rule
Variant: Flexible sharing rule, no ﬁxed costs
percentage 1% increase 1% increase 1 guilder
with gross wage gross wage increase
increase rate husband rate wife non-labour
in: income
unmarried subsample
consumption husband 87.4 84.9 1.5
consumption wife 99.5 95.8 99.7
share (husband) 5.5 90.7 1.5
married subsample
consumption husband 88.7 10.8 1.2
consumption wife 97.7 99.8 99.4
share (husband) 9.1 22.6 11.7
Variant: Flexible sharing rule, ﬁxed costs
percentage 1% increase 1% increase 1 guilder
with gross wage gross wage increase
positive rate husband rate wife non-labour
change in: income
unmarried subsample
consumption husband 3.8 72.3 0.8
consumption wife 100.0 97.8 99.7
share (husband) 8.4 76.9 0.1
married subsample
consumption husband 75.4 81.6 98.6
consumption wife 100.0 100.0 99.0
share (husband) 13.4 92.8 97.9
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Table 10: Changing the tax policy
Implications for sharing
Model variant:
Restricted Unrestricted
sharing rule: sharing rule
income splitting
Percentage without with without with
with ﬁxed ﬁxed ﬁxed ﬁxed
increase in: costs costs costs costs
unmarried subsample
consumption husband 18.5 17.9 99.2 56.0
consumption wife 99.8 99.9 13.5 57.1
share husband 0.0 0.0 27.6 0.2
share wife 18.5 19.5 2.9 6.7
married subsample
consumption husband 45.8 37.5 100.0 12.1
consumption wife 100.0 99.5 56.9 95.8
share husband 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
share wife 45.8 51.3 12.5 50.9
Table 11: Changing the tax policy
Implications for working hours and participation
Model variant:
Restricted Unrestricted
sharing rule: sharing rule
income splitting
without with without with
Change in: ﬁxed ﬁxed ﬁxed ﬁxed
costs costs costs costs
unmarried subsample
working hours husband 1.3 0.9 0.1 -0.1
working hours wife 0.4 0.5 1.0 0.4
participation husband 2.3 1.0 1.3 0.8
participation wife 1.6 1.1 1.2 0.5
married subsample
working hours husband 1.1 1.0 2.2 0.0
working hours wife 2.1 1.5 1.7 1.6
participation husband 1.4 1.5 3.8 -0.1
participation wife 6.4 4.6 4.7 5.1
Working hours: change in average number per week
Participation: change in percentage points
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A The wage equation
The parameters estimates of the wage equations in (13) are obtained in a ﬁrst step. The
parameters of the wage equation are estimated simultaneously with a selection equation
for the labour market state. Let dj be an indicator taking the value 1 if household
member j is employed and taking the value 0 if not. The selection equation is
d∗j = m
′
jθj + lj, j = m, f
dj = ι(d
∗
j > 0)
(30)
The error terms of the wage equation (13) and the selection equation (30) is assumed to
be distributed according to the bivariate normal distribution:(
lj
vj
)
∼ N
((
0
0
)
,
(
1 ρvl,jτj
ρvl,jτj τ
2
j
))
, j = m, f (31)
in which ρvl,j represents the correlation coeﬃcient between the error term of the wage
equation vj and the error in the selection equation lj . The parameters ηj, θj, ρlv,j , and
τj are estimated simultaneously by maximum likelihood.
Table A.1 contains the maximum-likelihood estimates of the parameters of the par-
ticipation equation and table A.2 contains the estimates of the wage equations of both
husband and wife. In the wage equation we included a quadratic in the individual’s age,
dummy variables for the level of education, dummy variables for the type, or sector,
of education, and time dummies. Note that the selection equation may be interpreted
as an approximation of the ‘reduced form’ employment equation that follows from the
structural model. In the employment equation we include all the variables that appear
as taste shifters in the utility function, which are the age of both partners, the level of
education of both partners, and the marital status. Since the participation decision also
depends on the wage of the partner, we also include the sector dummies of the part-
ner in the employment equation. Because of the ‘reduced form’ nature of the selection
equation it is hard to interpret the values of the estimates, and we do not devote much
time discussing them. Nevertheless we may point at some interesting interactions of the
partner’s education on the employment status. We see that men with the lowest level
of education have a lower probability of being employment, and we see that men with
wives who have any of the middle three education levels have a higher probability of
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being employed than men whose wives have either the lowest education level or univer-
sity level. For the female employment status we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact of the
husband’s level of education, but we do see that her probability of being in employment
increases monotonically with her own level of education. Since the employment equation
is reduced form, we do not know whether this increasing pattern is due to the wage or
due to preferences. The correlation coeﬃcient for the correlation between the errors of
the employment and wage equation are signiﬁcant for both husband and wife, showing
the relevance of incorporating selectivity in the estimation of the parameters of the wage
equation.
Table A.2 shows the estimates of the wage equations. Both the wage equation of the
husband and of the wife show an increasing pattern in the level of education, and both
men and women with an economic/administrative or a general type of education have
higher wages than men and women working in technical or service sector.
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Table A1: ML Estimates of the employment equations
Husband Wife
Variable estimate std. err. estimate std. err.
intercept -0.247 0.230 1.294 0.202
log(age husband/17) 5.748 0.616 -0.877 0.522
log(age husb./17) squared -4.049 0.385 0.477 0.323
log(age wife/17) -0.927 0.496 3.261 0.459
log(age wife/17) squared 0.418 0.333 -2.975 0.303
Education level husband 1 -0.665 0.141 -0.439 0.096
Education level husband 2 -0.255 0.117 -0.279 0.078
Education level husband 3 -0.081 0.109 -0.213 0.072
Education level husband 4 -0.024 0.112 -0.178 0.073
Education level wife 1 -0.131 0.115 -0.683 0.130
Education level wife 2 0.206 0.106 -0.541 0.119
Education level wife 3 0.331 0.104 -0.324 0.115
Education level wife 4 0.230 0.106 -0.223 0.119
Married 0.090 0.048 -0.114 0.047
Sector Technical husband -0.026 0.055 0.002 0.040
Sector Econ./adm. husband 0.034 0.061 0.035 0.056
Sector General husband 0.062 0.076 -0.144 0.089
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Table A1: ML Estimates of the employment equations (ctd.)
Husband Wife
Variable estimate std. err. estimate std. err.
Sector Technical wife -0.102 0.064 0.062 0.050
Sector Econ./adm. wife -0.013 0.048 -0.043 0.047
Sector General wife 0.097 0.049 -0.220 0.325
µ/1000 -0.186 0.321 0.771 0.527
(µ/1000)2 0.149 0.424 -0.343 0.082
1990 -0.343 0.105 -0.364 0.086
1991 -0.144 0.106 -0.317 0.086
1992 -0.207 0.105 -0.299 0.087
1993 -0.235 0.105 -0.272 0.083
1994 -0.210 0.103 -0.197 0.085
1995 -0.061 0.108 -0.188 0.082
1996 -0.112 0.104 -0.142 0.084
1997 -0.073 0.104 -0.095 0.085
1998 -0.119 0.106 -0.182 0.085
1999 -0.106 0.107 -0.147 0.088
2000 -0.066 0.105 -0.17* 0.09
ρvl,m -0.953 0.007 – –
ρvl,f – – -0.935 0.006
**: signiﬁcant at 5% level, *: 10% level
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Table A2: ML Estimates of the Wage equations
Husband Wife
Variable estimate std. err. estimate std. err.
intercept 3.377 0.085 3.082 0.091
log(age/17) -0.044 0.189 0.598 0.182
log(age/17) squared 0.490 0.116 0.087 0.124
Education level 1 -0.336 0.052 -0.232 0.068
Education level 2 -0.335 0.042 -0.210 0.062
Education level 3 -0.262 0.038 -0.189 0.060
Education level 4 -0.116 0.043 -0.068 0.064
Technical 0.030 0.023 0.054 0.044
Econ./adm. 0.059 0.025 0.027 0.027
General 0.069 0.031 0.068 0.027
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Table A2: ML Estimates of the Wage equations (ctd.)
Husband Wife
Variable estimate std. err. estimate std. err.
1990 -0.111 0.043 -0.118 0.047
1991 -0.063 0.042 -0.097 0.049
1992 -0.018 0.043 -0.063 0.048
1993 0.003 0.043 -0.070 0.049
1994 -0.065 0.042 -0.080 0.046
1995 -0.071 0.044 -0.117 0.047
1996 -0.070 0.041 -0.081 0.044
1997 -0.071 0.042 -0.092 0.046
1998 -0.061 0.043 -0.079 0.046
1999 -0.029 0.044 -0.026 0.047
2000 -0.011 0.042 -0.029 0.049
τm 0.491 0.004 – –
τf – – 0.572 0.008
**: signiﬁcant at 5% level, *: 10% level
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